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Introduction
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument1 is increasing in fre-
quency and appears to be perniciously resistant to eradication. Because
of its potentially disastrous effects2 upon a criminal trial, it demands
the attention of prosecutors and the defense bar alike. As stated by Mr.
Justice Drew: "Many a winning touchdown has been called back and
nullified because someone on the offensive team violated a rule by
which the game was to be played. '"'
This article will explore the parameters imposed upon a prosecutor
in Florida4 in arguments to the jury,5 the effects of failure to adhere to
those standards,6 and the procedural rules governing this area of the
law.7
* Judge, Monroe County Court, The Florida Keys, Florida. B.A. University of
South Florida 1976; J.D. Stetson University College of Law 1979, M.A. University of
South Florida 1979. During the research and writing of this article, Judge Defoor was
an Assistant State Attorney in the 16th Judicial Circuit of Florida.
1. The reasoning may also be applied to improper opening statements, as the rule
would be the same. Of course, there should, in theory, be no arguments advanced in
opening. Cf. Juhasz v. Darton, 146 Fla. 484, 1 So. 2d 476, 478 (1941).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
3. Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612, 616 (Fla. 1967).
4. The laws of other jurisdictions will only be considered as they reflect or am-
plify principles of Florida law.
5. Arguments have been referred to by commentators such as Note, Prosecutor
Forensic Misconduct-"Harmless Error?" 6 UTAH L. REV. 108, 108 (1958) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Prosecutor Forensic Misconduct], and have been defined as "any activity
by the prosecutor which tends to divert the jury from making its determination of guilt
or innocence by weighing the legally admitted evidence in the manner prescribed by
law . ." Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prose-
cution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 949 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct].
6. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 208-28.
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Recent Trends
The recent case of State v. Gomez8 concluded with the prosecu-
tor's summation:
Don't let that gentleman [the victim] with three children and a
wife walk away without justice in this case, facing possible jail, an
arm that's hideously changed the rest of his life and let these gen-
tlemen [the defendant and codefendant] walk away into our com-
munity and commit further crimes of this nature. These assassins
must be put away. It is your duty to do that. You told me you'll do
that.9
The Third District Court of Appeal expressed its obvious exasperation
with the prosecutor thus: "We add to the growing list of cases requiring
reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, the case of Jos6
Gomez." 10 The court noted dryly that in this case, the victim for whom
the prosecutor pled for "justice" was an admitted perjurer, as were all
of the State's witnesses, while the "assassin" had no prior criminal
record.1"
In the subsequent case of Jackson v. State, 2 the exasperation of
the district court reached a peak. In the face of the prosecutorial argu-
ment which it termed "utterly and grossly improper,"13 the court in
Jackson chose to react to the "veritable torrent of cases which have
simiarly involved significant prosecutorial improprieties committed by
assistant state attorneys in this district. 1 14 Noting that the volume of
such cases included multiple improprieties by individual prosecutors, 5
the court stated that a pattern seemed to be emerging: "[W]e must
suspect, however reluctantly, that the improprieties may be deliberately
8. 415 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).




12. 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 16. See infra note 20.
15. 421 So. 2d at 16. The court stressed it was not the prosecutor in the case sub
judice. They appear to have been directing their fire at the Gomez prosecutor. Id. See
infra note 24.
2
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calculated to accomplish just what representatives of the state cannot
be permitted - inducing a jury to convict by unfairly prejudicing it
against the defendant."16 The Jackson court noted that other sanctions,
such as stern judicial admonitions, reversals, discipline by superiors or
self-adherence to the prosecutor's oaths and Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, had all failed.17 The court went to to "serve notice"' , that
it was prepared to go to the extraordinary measures of analyzing each
instance of misconduct, to refer instances of abuse to the Florida Bar or
to seek discipline directly in circuit court. 19 While the year 1982 has
yielded a great number of cases20 and a large amount of public com-
ment21 as well as strong judicial protest concerning reversal of criminal
cases for improper prosecutorial argument,22 the phenomenon is by no
means a recent one. Each generation of judges seems to supplant the
preceeding one in decrying the occurrence of needless behavior which
too often leads to the squandering of judicial resources. Yet it continues
in the face of the sternest denunciations. 3
16. Jackson, 421 So. 2d at 16.
17. Id. at 16-17.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id.
20. The year 1982 has yielded no less than ten reversals predicated upon im-
proper closing arguments by prosecutors: Wheeler v. State, 1983 Fla. L.W. 124 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Collins v. State, 423 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Simpson v.
State, 418 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1982); Gomez v. State, 415 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Harris v. State, 414 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Ramos v.
State, 413 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Cooper v. State, 413 So. 2d 1244
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Harper v. State, 411 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (a case re-
versed for improper questioning by the prosecutor); Chapman v. State, 417 So. 2d 1028
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); as well as several close calls, Williams v. State, 1983
Fla. L.W. 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) Thomas v. State, 419 So. 2d 634 (Fla.
1982); Kindell v. State, 413 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Westley v.
State, 416 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Nelson v. State, 416 So. 2d 899
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982). This trend
has continued in 1983. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, - So. 2d ., 8 Fla. L.W. 868
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
21. Fiery Talk Causes Reversal of Conviction, Miami Herald, July 4, 1982, at
1B, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Fiery Talk].
22. See Jackson, 421 So. 2d at 16.
23. "It imposes an added burden on the taxpayers for court expenses and clutters
3
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In reality, such abuses may be regrettable, but they inevitably lurk
at the threshold of every criminal trial. 4 This type of conduct arises
the docket of this court with unnecessary appeals." Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494,
495 (Fla. 1951). Compare Gomez v. State, 415 So. 2d 822 with Grant v. State, 194 So.
2d 612, 615 (Fla. 1967) ("as an increasing number of cases reaching us in recent years,
we must undo all of that which has been done and send this case back for a new trial")
with Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494, 494 (Fla. 1951) ("so many times condemned...
that the law against it would seem to be so commonplace that any layman would be
familiar with and observe it") with Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 114, 43 So. 312, 317
(Fla. 1907) ("No extended comment upon these utterances of counsel for the prosecu-
tion in their arguments to the jury is necessary."). See also Cain, Sensational Prosecu-
tions and Reversals, 7 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1931).
24. "[I]solated examples of understandable, if inexcusable, overzealousness in
the heat of trial," Jackson, 421 So. 2d at 16. In analyzing a number of such reversals
which had occurred in her office recently, Eleventh Circuit State Attorney Janet Reno
was quoted as citing a number of reasons which together she saw as producing the
comments. Fiery Talk, supra note 21.
These factors were "greenness" of staff, lack of proper training, pressure of com-
munity concern over crime, the precariousness of the prosecutor's balancing act be-
tween advocate and seeker of justice, frustration over defense tactics, and the difference
between appellate review of a cold record and the heat of trial with its split second
decisions. Id.
Most of the factors cited are the inevitable by-product of the conflicting roles and
duties of public prosecutors, discussed infra notes 28-42.
Ms. Reno may have hit the nail on the head in the discussion of the "greenness" of
staff. This is a factor common to virtually every prosecutor's office, due to rapid turno-
ver. The average tenure of a prosecutor nationwide is less than two years. See C. SIL-
BERMAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 375 (1978).
This inexperience leads to a failure to fully understand and reconcile the conflict-
ing duties of advocate and seeker of justice. In Gomez the prosecutor, a Reno em-
ployee, was receiving his second reversal for such comments. Unchastened, he was
quoted as strongly disagreeing with the appellate court decision (calling it a "travesty
of justice," Fiery Talk, supra note 21), stating further that in his experience the less
evidence against a defendant, the more likely he would be to resort to inflammatory
argument. Contra, State v. Cyty, 50 Nev. 256, 256 P. 793 (1927) and State v. Kirk,
227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
The prosecutor was ultimately quoted as claiming "victory" based upon the two
years incarceration which the defendant served during the pendency of the appeal -
"When you get to the bottom line, I won." Fiery Talk, supra note 21. In discussing the
apparently deliberate pattern of prosecutorial abuse which it saw emerging, the court
in Jackson observed: "This may be - although we are loathe to consider the possibil-
ity - because some prosecutors believe that keeping a convicted defendant in prison
during the sometimes lengthy appellate process is enough to chalk up a 'win' even if the
4
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primarily as a by-product of the heat of combat2 and the conflicting
duties assumed by the public prosecutor.2" As stated by Judge Mann
with predictable eloquence, "[i]f oratory comes can reversal be far
behind?" 21
The Public Prosecutor's Duty
While there are rules governing the conduct of all counsel in argu-
ment,218 the prosecutor is uniquely placed in a position of conflicting
professional obligations. Unlike the defense attorney whose duty, sub-
ject to certain obligations to the court, is to his client,29 the prosecutor
has duties to the State, to the defendant, as well as special obligations
to the court and judicial system."
On one hand he is an advocate of his cause, expected to prevail for
his client, the sovereign.31 At the same time, because of the nature of
conviction is later reversed." 421 So. 2d. at 16 n.4.
Another commentator has asserted that such abuses may be traced to four basic
causes: "a) Sincere, but excessive, zeal of prosecuting attorneys; b) Headline seeking
prosecutors; c) Sheer ignorance of the proper function of a prosecuting attorney and of
criminal law; d) Timidity and indifference of trial court judges." Cain, supra note 23,
at 2.
25. "[L]apsus linguae in the heat of argument," Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d
811, 814 (Fla. 1957). See also Fiery Talk, supra note 21; Jackson, supra note 24.
26. See supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 28-42.
27. Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 750, 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
28. See, e.g., FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106
(1981).
29. For an excellent discussion of defense counsel and closing argument, see
Martin, Closing Argument to the Jury for the Defense in Criminal Cases, 10 CRIM.
L.Q. 3.4 (1967).
30. "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advo-
cate; his duty is to seek justice not merely to convict." FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981). ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
The Prosecution Function, § 1.1 (Approved Draft 1971); Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40,
43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
31. "[T]he prosecutor represents the sovereign..." FLORIDA BAR CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(1), cf. id. at 7-13(2); Washington v. State, 86
Fla. 533, 543, 98 So. 605, 609 (1923) "not to consider himself merely as attorney of
record for the state, struggling for a verdict (emphasis supplied). "[H]e represents the
great authority of the State of Florida." Kirk, 227 So. 2d at 43.
5
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that power, he is expected to exercise it with great discretion.3 2 At odds
with his duty as advocate, he has a specific duty to the defendant which
requires him to negate or mitigate the defendant's guilt.3 3 Beyond those
duties, he has a special obligation to the court which has been termed
"semi-judicial. 3 4 In the early case of Washington v. State,3 5 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court summed up these often conflicting duties:
The prosecuting attorney occupies a semijudicial position. He is a
sworn officer of the government, with no greater duty imposed on
him than to preserve intact all the great sanctions and traditions of
the law. It matters not how guilty a defendant in his opinion may
be, it is his duty under oath to see that no conviction takes place
except in strict conformity to law. His primary considerations
should be to develop the facts and the evidence for the guidance of
the court and jury, and not to consider himself merely as attorney
of record for the state, struggling for a verdict. 8
In short his obligation is to see that "justice is done."137
In argument before the jury these duties restrain the prosecutor
from language which directs the jury to anything but the facts of the
case and the law.38 It has been asserted that the accused has a funda-
32. FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(2); Kirk,
227 So. 2d at 43.
33. In our system of criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit
of all reasonable doubts. With respect to evidence and witnesses, the prose-
cutor has responsibilities different from those of a lawyer in private prac-
tice: the prosecutor should make timely disclosure to the defense of availa-
ble evidence, known to him that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a
prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely be-
cause be believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused.
FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3).
34. See, e.g., Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 23 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1945); Akin v.
State, 86 Fla. 564, 572, 98 So. 609, 612 (1923); Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 542,
98 So. 605, 609 (1923).
35. 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605 (1923).
36. Id. at 573-74, 98 So. at 609.
37. See FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13.
38. See FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY DR 7-106; ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function §§ 5.8, 5.9 (Approved
Draft 1971).
6
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mental right to a fair trial free of improper argument.3 9 However, due
to the nature of lawyers and the adversary system the line will often be
difficult to draw. °
The United States Supreme Court summed it up by stating:
"[W]hile he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones."'41 Yet another court said of improper prosecutorial argument,
"[i]f the state has a strong case, it is not necessary, and if it has a close
case, such misconduct is gross injustice to the defendant."' 2
Comment upon the Defendant's Silence
The ultimate and unpardonable 3 sin in a prosecutor's argument is
directing any comment towards the defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent." Because of the special significance of the rules in this
area, it will be considered first and separately. Rule 3.250 of the Flor-
ida Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the prosecutor from comment-
ing upon the failure of a criminal defendant to take the stand.'5 The
39. Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
40. Tyson v. State, 87 Fla. 392, 394, 100 So. 254, 255 (1924). See ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function § 5.8 commentary at 122
(Approved Draft 1971). "To attempt to spell out in detail what can and cannot be said
in argument is impossible, since it will depend on the facts of the particular case." See
also infra note 123.
41. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
42. State v. Cyty, 50 Nev. 256, ., 256 P. 793, 794 (1927). Accord Kirk v. State,
227 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1959): "If his case is a sound one, his
evidence is enough. If it is not sound, he should not resort to innuendo to give it a false
appearance of strength. Cases brought on behalf of the State of Florida should be
conducted with a dignity worthy of the client."
43. See infra text accompanying notes 44-61.
44. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla.
1979).
45. The text of the rule reads as follows:
Accused as Witness
In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a
witness in his own behalf, and shall in such case be subject to examination
as other witnesses, but no accused person shall be compelled to give testi-
mony against himself, nor shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted
before the jury or court to comment on the failure of the accused to testify
in his own behalf, and a defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf,
except his own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the
7
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rule arises from several constitutional roots.
The prohibition against compelling a defendant to testify against
himself has a long history in Florida46 and United States Constitutional
law.4 7 In the later part of the eighteenth century, there was a nation-
wide erosion of the common-law rule which held a defendant incompe-
tent to testify in his own behalf. While this story has been covered in
more depth elsewhere,48 suffice it to say that by 1895, an act of the
legislature of Florida had fully abrogated the common-law rule, and a
criminal defendant had the privilege to become a sworn witness in his
own behalf, subject to the same status as any other witness.4 9 This
jury.
Rule 3.250 FLA. R. CRIM. P. (1972 Rev.).
46. "No person shall be. .. compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness
against himself." FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. 1, § 9. Similar provisions have been a part
of Florida's Constitution since its original constitution in 1838. FLA. CONST. OF 1885,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 12; FLA. CONST. OF 1868, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8;
FLA. CONST. OF 1865, art. 1, § 10; FLA. CONST. OF 1861, art 1, § 10; FLA. CONST. of
1838, art. 1, § 10.
47. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This has been a part of the Constitution
since 1791, though its parameters have been subject to expansion and contraction in
recent years.
48. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 579 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979); Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
The sequence of this progression in Florida, and the nature of what Florida
progressed from, has never been perfectly clear. See De Foor & Mitchell, Hybrid Rep-
resentation: The Right of Criminal Defendant to Participate in His Trial as Co-Coun-
sel, 10 STETSON L. REV. 191 (1981); De Foor, Lewis & Mitchell, The Right to Dual
Representation, 18 Hous. L. REV. 519 (1981). It is clear that Florida adhered to the
common law rule. See cases cited in this note.
It is equally clear that by the latter part of the 19th century, the legislature had
created the right for a criminal defendant to make a sworn statement to the jury, but
without examination by counsel or the court. This innovation occurred in 1870. See Act
Concerning Testimony, 1870 Fla. Laws, ch. 1816, § I (amended 1898); Hancock v.
State, 79 Fla. 701, 706, 85 So. 142, 143-44 (1920) (Brown, J., dissenting); Millar v.
State, 15 Fla. 577, 584 (1876). This right was broadened by the legislature in 1895 to
make the defendant in a criminal case subject to all of the rules applicable to witnesses.
See text of the Act contained infra at note 49. See also Hart v. State, 38 Fla. 39, 20
So. 805 (1896).
49. Act to Amend Section 2908, 1895 Fla. Laws 4420, § 1 (repealed 1970)
provided:
Accused may Make Himself a Witness. In all criminal prosecutions the
8
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same act also stated "nor shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted
before the court or jury to comment on the failure of the defendant to
testify in his own behalf."50 This provision is still seen as an essential
protection of the right against self-incrimination which became neces-
sary once a defendant had the opportunity to testify in his own
behalf.51
While the United States Supreme Court has fairly recently made
it clear that any such comment is strictly prohibited by the fifth
amendment,52 the Florida courts took a similar position early-on. By
1924 the Florida Supreme Court had taken the then-minority53 view
that such comment was improper and incurable.5 Further, the impro-
accused may at his option be sworn as a witness in his own behalf and
shall in such case be subject to examination as other witnesses, but no
accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor
shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the court or jury to
comment on the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf.
This remained the law, essentially unchanged until its repeal in 1970. See Ratiner,
Adverse Comments by a Florida Prosecutor upon a Defendant's Failure to Testify, 15
U. MIAMI L. REv. 293, 295 n.12 (1961) and history of FLA. STAT. 918. 091 (1959).
The provisions of Florida Statutes section 918.09 were adopted into Rule 3.250 of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1967 and were unchanged in the 1972 revision,
see Committee Notes Rule 3.250, FLA. R. CRIM. P., and remain the law in Florida.
50. Act to Amend Section 2908, 1895 Fla. Laws 4420, § 1. Florida prosecutors
began to test the limits with the basic "unexplained and uncontradicted" evidence ar-
gument, almost immediately. Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174, 28 So. 53 (1900). See infra
notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
51. Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524, 540 (Fla. 1958); Burse v. State, 175 So. 2d
586, 587 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See generally Ratiner, supra note 49.
52. Calloway v. Wainwright, 409 U.S. 59 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
53. See Ratiner, supra note 49 and Note, The Nature and Consequences of Fo-
rensic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 960 n.68.
54. Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 31-32, 98 So. 613, 618 (1924). As early as 1903
the supreme court had indicated in dicta that there "might" be cases where such com-
ment would not be reversible error while not finding it to be likely. Jackson v. State, 45
Fla. 38, 34 So. 243 (1903).
The rule had an interesting evolution in Florida. Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645,
190 So. 756 (1939) became the principal case for the proposition that this sort of error
was not subject to the harmless error rule. Simmons was directly repudiated in State v.
Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (1967), which was itself repudiated and the rule of Simmons
was re-established in Willinsky v. State, 360 So. 2d 760, 762-63 (Fla. 1978).
The recent decision of Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 335-36 (Fla. 1978) dis-
9
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priety of the comment is not affected by how inadvertant or indirect 55
the comment might be, or by the prosecutor's denial of any intent to
comment on the defendant's right.56 In terms of construction, if the
comment is subject to an interpretation that brings it within the rule, it
is so construed, regardless of susceptibility to a differing construction. 57
Indeed, the cases reversing for prosecutorial comment on this point
have ranged from the egregious58 to the subtle.5" The rule applies
equally to comment by a prosecutor about the failure of a co-defendant
to testify. 0 It does not extend, however, to such comment by a co-
defendant's counsel.61
A failure to contemporaneously object to the comment will be seen
cussed infra at note 207, which places strict technical requirements upon the receipt of
the benefits of this rule, has been seen as another retreat. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
55. Flaherty v. State, 183 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966)(and
cases cited therein). But see Helton v. State, 424 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
56. Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957); Milton v. State, 127 So. 2d
460 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
57. Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 31, 98 So. 613, 618 (1924); Jackson v. State, 45
Fla. 38, 34 So. 243 (1903).
The rule may well be such as to be stated thus: if the prosecutor's comment is
"'fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a statement to the effect that an
innocent man would attempt to explain the circumstances but the defendant offered no
such explanation. . . .'" then the comment thus intepreted or construed violated the
prohibition of the rule. David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (quoting David v. State, 348 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(Mager, J., dissenting), which quashed the lower court's decision.
58. As an example of the egregious see David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla.
1979). The defense attorney apparently had hypothesized a defense predicated upon a
business failure. The prosecutor argued the permissible line of "Where is the evidence,"
see infra notes 66-77, only to succumb to "If he had a business failure,. . . why didn't
he say anything. . .?" David, 369 So. 2d at 944 (emphasis omitted). The conviction
was reversed.
59. As an example of the subtle, see Hall v. State, 364 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) where the prosecutor referred to the defense counsel's attempt to shift
the focus of the case from the defendant whom he characterized as sitting there "qui-
etly." Id. at 867.
60. Clouser v. State, 152 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Harper
v. State, 151 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
61. Jenkins v. State, 317 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Smith v.
State, 238 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). But see Cruz v. State, 328
So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See generally, Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 989 (1965).
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/1
7:1983 Prosecutorial Misconduct 453 1
as waiver of the benefits of this rule. 2 A defendant may also waive the
benefits of the rule by taking the stand 3 or by comment of defense
counsel." Further, by taking the stand he becomes subject to the full
range of cross-examination based on what he did and did not say.65
However, not all comments which seem to brush against this sub-
ject are cause for reversal. Much confusion has resulted from a prose-
cutor's characterization of his case as "uncontroverted" or "unex-
plained" in cases where the defendant did not testify. Prosecutors were
using this double entendre almost as soon as they were prohibited from
commenting upon a defendant's silence.66 For a long while such com-
ments were allowed on the theory that they were comments on the evi-
dence, not the defendant's silence.6 7 The trend then began to run the
other way, to the point that one court held "when the defendant elects
not to testify, it is error to refer to the State's evidence as unexplained
or uncontradicted, or undenied." 8
The supreme court later allowed such a comment in two cases
62. Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1978).
63. Hufham v. State, 400 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Blackwell v.
State, 271 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43
So. 312 (1903).
64. See Doctrine of Invited Comment or Fair Reply, infra, text accompanying
notes 152-70.
65. [T]he failure of the defendant to testify cannot be taken or considered
as any admission against his interest; but, if a defendant voluntarily takes
the stand and testifies as a witness in his own behalf, then he becomes
subject to cross-examination as any other witness, and the prosecuting of-
ficer has the right to comment on his testimony, his manner and demeanor
on the stand, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his statements, and
on the discrepancies which may appear in his testimony to the same extent
as would be proper with reference to testimony of any other witness.
Dabney v. State, 119 Fla. 341, 343, 161 So. 380, 381 (1935). Accord Jordan v. State,
334 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1976); Odom v. State, 109 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1959); Craft v. State,
300 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Coney v. State, 258 So. 2d 497
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Peel v. State, 154 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
66. Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174, 28 So. 53 (1900).
67. Id. See also Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So. 389 (1908).
68. Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (citing Way
v. State, 67 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953)). Accord Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla.
1957).
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where the defense counsel advanced theories of coerced confession69
and insanity without the defendant's testimony.70 Then, in the case of
White v. State,7 1 the Third District Court held that such a comment
was permitted as a comment on the evidence where the testimony of
several witnesses was heard.7 2 This was approved by the supreme court,
which cited the earlier line of cases allowing such comment.73 Subse-
quently in Smith v. State,7 4 the Fifth District Court of Appeals relying
on White stated: "Indeed, if a prosecutor could not make fair comment
on the fact that the state's evidence of guilt was uncontroverted, what
would be left for him to argue in a case where the defendant declined
to testify? '75 The district court has since reaffirmed its position in the
case of Elam v. State.7 6 The Third District has taken a similar view in
th case of Budman v. State.7 7
Some of the confusion in this area has resulted from the jury in-
struction based on the common-law presumption that a person in unex-
plained possession of recently stolen property is presumed to know it
was stolen.7 8 The question was whether the instruction was an infringe-
69. "Now did you hear one thing about him getting beaten up, or somebody was
pounding on his head, forcing him into this?" State v. Mathis, 278 So. 2d 280, 281
(Fla. 1973).
70. "Now where is the evidence that he says he didn't know what he was do-
ing?" State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. 1967).
71. 348 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
72. "You haven't heard one word of testimony to contradict what she [State's
witness] said, other than the lawyer's argument." Id. at 369.
73. "It is proper for a prosecutor in closing argument to refer to the evidence as
it exists before the jury and to point out that there is an absence of evidence on a
certain issue. It is thus firmly embedded in the jurisprudence of this state that a prose-
cutor may comment on the uncontradicted or uncontroverted nature of the evidence
during argument to the jury." White v. State, 377 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 1979) (cita-
tions omitted). Firmly embedded indeed! See cases at note 68.
74. 378 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), aft'd, Smith v. State, 394 So.
2d 407 (Fla. 1980).
75. Id. at 314.
76. 389 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
77. 362 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
78. Florida Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal Cases, Theft 148 provides:
Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily ex-
plained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the prop-
erty knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.
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ment of the defendant's right to remain silent.79 Early cases held that a
prosecutor may not use the instruction in argument, but the instruction
itself was approved.8 0
In light of the positions taken by the courts in White,"' Budman, 2
and Smith,83 this confusion may not be relevant. The exact parameters
placed upon the prosecutor's argument that the evidence is uncontro-
verted, remain unclear from these opinions. May it be advanced at all
times, or only where it may be seen as a comment on the evidence,
rather than on the defendant's silence? The language of the Fifth Dis-
trict in Smith84 and Elam85 suggest the former, while the language of
the Third District in White8 suggests the latter.8 7
There are several directions which the Florida courts might head
on this point. 8 Some jurisdictions allow such comments if they appear
to refer to a witness other than the defendant.8 ' The Florida courts
already allow comment that the defendant did not provide a witness
that he could reasonably be expected to provide.90 Still others would
seem to allow this line of argument 1 even when the defendant would
79. See generally State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 853 (1969) and Smith v. State, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1980).
80.. The instruction has been held to be constitutional. See cases cited supra note
79. Ard v. State, 108 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1959). The case ignores the fact that such an
explanation need not necessarily come from the defendant himself.
81. 348 So. 2d 368.
82. 362 So. 2d 1022.
83. 378 So. 2d 313.
84. Id.
85. 309 So. 2d 221.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
87. "If the evidence presented a situation where the only person who could have
contradicted the witness' testimony was the defendant himself, then this comment
might have been interpreted as the defendant suggests." 348 So. 2d at 369.
88. See generally Annnot., 14 A.L.R.3d 723 (1967).
89. See, e.g., Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1965).
90. The witness must be competent and available. Buckrem v. State, 355 So. 2d
111 (Fla. 1978). This is especially true if a witness is a spouse. Jenkins v. State, 317
So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
91. It can take other forms: see, e.g., "undenied," State v. Hampton, 430 S.W.2d
160 (Mo. 1968); "unrefuted," United States v. Guiliano, 383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1967);
"uncontroverted," Ruiz v. United States, 365 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1966).
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be the only witness who could reasonably be expected to refute it.92
Clarification will be needed on this point in the future. In a related
matter, Florida courts have allowed prosecutors to argue that guilt
could be inferred from the defendant's flight. 3
Permissible Scope of Argument
Other than the special rules concerning comment upon the defen-
dant's failure to testify, the rules concerning a prosecutor's argument
are fairly broad. As long as his arguments are predicated upon the evi-
dence in the case,9' "wide latitude is permitted in argument to the
jury."9 5 The prosecutor is allowed to advance all legitimate argu-
ments, 96 and is free to make logical inferences based upon the evidence
to support his theory of the case. 7 The Supreme Court of Florida has
stated that these inferences may include "the fanciful play of imagina-
tions,"98 and inferrences are not objectionable merely because they
overcharacterize, 99 or soundness of logic, or relevancy 00 may be lack-
92. See, e.g., People v. Stanbeary, 126 Il1. App. 2d 244, 261 N.E.2d 765 (1970).
93. Cf. Palmer v. State, 323 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975) and cases
cited therein at 615 n.2.
94. Powell v. State, 93 Fla. 756, 112 So. 608 (1927); Johnson v. State, 88 Fla.
461, 464, 102 So. 549, 550 (1924); Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605
(1923); Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, -, 98 So. 609, 618 (1922).
95. Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982); Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d
413 (Fla. 1975); Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
880 (1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 904 (1963); Smith v. State, 365 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Johnson v. State, 348 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Pitts v. State, 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
918 (1975); Wilson v. State, 305 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Frazer v.
State, 294 so. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
96. Spencer, 133 So. 2d at 731.
97. Breedlove, 413 So. 2d at 8; Spencer, 133 So. 2d at 731.
98. Gaston v. Stater, 134 Fla. 538-542, 184 So. 150, 151-52 (1938); Johnson v.
State, 86 Fla. 461, -, 102 So. 549, 550 (1924). "His illustrations may be as various
as are the resources of his genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his learn-
ing can make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit or wing to his imagination."
Washington v. State, 82 Fla. 533, -, 98 So. 605, 609 (1923)(citing Mitchum v. State,
11 Ga. 615, 631 (1852)).
99. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 152 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1963). In Schneider the
prosecutor's argument dwelt upon the deceased's head having been "blown-off," while,
in fact, he had been shot in the head and neck. Id. at 735.
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ing. Generally speaking, much discretion is vested in the trial court in
keeping counsel's arguments within the scope of the issues and evi-
dence.101 There have been cases where prosecutors made statements so
far from the facts as to constitute deliberate misrepresentation.0 2 Such
cases are, fortunately, rare, and are so obviously reprehensible and re-
versible as to be undeserving of further comment. 103
Prosecutor's Statement of Opinion or Personal Belief
The prosecutor in a case is an advocate, and not a sworn witness
capable of rendering testimony, much less any sort of expert testimony
such as an opinion.'" By rendering an opinion in a factual or ultimate
matter concerning a case, a prosecutor, in effect, renders unsworn testi-
mony not subject to cross-examination. 10 5 The advocacy of a prosecu-
tor's opinion has been prohibited by Florida law at least since 1907,108
and is also in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 107 yet
100. Brown v. State, 80 Fla. 741, 744, 86 So. 574, 575 (1920); Wilson v. State,
47 Fla. 118, 36 So. 580 (1904); Mitchell v. State, 43 Fla. 584, 31 So. 242 (1901). Cf.
Gines v. State, 97 Fla. 908, ., 112 So. 525, 527 (1929); Goshea v. State, 97 Fla. 621,
121 So. 797 (1929).
101. See cases cited supra note 94.
102. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935); Flicker v. State,
296 So. 2d 109, 113 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
103. Cf Berger, 295 U.S. 78. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The
Prosecution Function § 5.8 (Approved Draft 1971). See also ABA STANDARDS, The
Defense Function § 7.8 (Approved Draft 1971), as to a similar obligation upon the
defense. Cf Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, 574, 98 So. 609, 613 (1924).
104. "It is generally understood that the expression by counsel in argument
before the jury or personal opinion of guilt is not only bad form but highly improper, as
counsel is not a witness, nor under oath to speak the truth, nor called as an expert to
give his opinion." Tyson v. State, 87 Fla. 392, 394, 100 So. 254, 255 (1924).
105. Comment (a) to ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution
Function § 5.8, 127 (Approved Draft 1971). Note, The Nature and Consequences of
Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 955 (1954).
106. Adams v. State, 54 Fla. 1, 45 So. 494 (1907).
107. Disciplinary Rule DR 7-106(c)(4) (1981) of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility states:
"(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer
shall not:
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of the cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the
457 1Prosecutorial Misconduct17:1983
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it remains a common source of error.108
The statement by the prosecutor of his belief as to the defendant's
guilt is also impermissible. Prosecutors are human beings who often
believe very strongly in the justness of their cause. 109 As stated truth-
fully though improperly by one prosecutor: "The State doesn't prose-
cute someone because of their religion or race or their nationality. We
prosecute them because we believe they are guilty of crimes."110 Such
comments are prohibited though they do not always constitute revers-
ible error.111 Especially to be avoided are opinions which imply superior
knowledge or investigation beyond the facts in evidence, as the founda-
tion for the opinion.""2 There is a great danger that because of the pres-
guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the
evidence for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated
herein."
108. See cases cited infra notes 110-15.
109. See, e.g., the remarks of the reversed prosecutor contained in Fiery Talk,
supra note 14. See also Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct,
supra note 5, at 948. "He may consider himself engaged in a war against crime in
which no holds are barred in the struggle to overcome powerful, unscrupulous opposi-
tion." The same commentator went on to note more dryly: "Besides, a record of many
convictions is important to the prosecutor who wishes to further his political ambitions.
Even convictions subsequently reversed for misconduct have political utility, especially
where the trial is accompanied by sensational publicity, for the reversal may receive
less attention than the trial and the reputation of the fighting district attorney will be
preserved." Id.
110. Reed v. State, 333 So. 2d 524, 525-26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). For
virtually identical statements see McGuire v. State, 411 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Price v. State, 267 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Another
prosecutor stated the same thoughts, pehaps more mundanely by stating that the state
believed in the defendant's guilt "or we would not be here," Buckhann v. State, 356 So.
2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Yet another prosecutor went for the
homerun equivalent in expressing his belief in the defendant's guilt "with all my heart,
mind and soul." Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
111. Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1014 (1966); Tyson v. State, 87 Fla. 392, 100 So. 54 (1927); Arline v. State, 303 So.
2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Roundtree v. State, 229 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
112. In the case of Thompson v. State, 318 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975) the reversed prosecutor flatly asserted that he had numerous other witnesses he
could have called, and this was termed "highly improper." Id. at 552. Cf Richardson
v. State, 335 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Similar results have been
obtained where the opinion offered was a collective one, such as is obtained at a prose-
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tige of the office, and the presumably greater fact-finding abilities of
the office, the jury will be led to rely on the prosecutors opinion., 3 This
substitutes the prosecutor for the trier of fact, and is most likely to be
deemed reversible error.11 4 Expressions of personal belief as to the
credibility of witnesses are equally prohibited." 5
Not every comment which begins with "I think" is seen as an im-
proper expression of the prosecutor's opinion regarding the merits of
the case. There is a difference between the prosecutor's statement of his
belief in the defendant's guilt and his belief that the evidence proved
the defendant's guilt, with the latter allowed.118
The use of the words "I think" have been held, in context, to be a
deduction based upon the evidence, 17 or a prefatory statement,1 8
rather than an expression of opinion. Curiously, a prosecutor has been
allowed to state that he felt he was justified in filing an information, 1 "
and expressions of shock over a crime 1 0 have also been allowed. How-
ever, it clearly is the more ethical, professional and prudent practice for
cutor's office conference; Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959); or in the form
of office policy, Cummings v. State, 412 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982); or even the entire State of Florida, Buckhann v. State 356 So. 2d 1327, 1328
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); or of the police, Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d I (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), quashed, 330 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980). See also Oglesby v. State,
23 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1945) (police could tack other offenses on defendant); Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
113. Commentary, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosection
Function § 5.8 (Approved Draft 1971).
114. Thomson v. State, 318 So. 2d 549, 552 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
115. Cummings v. State, 412 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Buckhann v. State, 356 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Hancock v. State,
90 Fla. 178, 195 So. 401 (1925).
116. See Adams v. State, 54 Fla. 1, 5, 45 So. 494, 495 (1907); Washington v.
State, 86 Fla. 533, 536, 98 So. 605, 608 (1925). Cf Coleman v. State, 215 So. 2d 96,
98 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See generally, DR 7-106(c)(4) (1981), Budman v.
State, 362 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
117. Coleman, 215 So. 2d at 98 ("If you believe as I do.").
118. Edwards v. State, 288 So. 2d 540, 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) "the
prosecutor had an unfortunate habit of using these words to introduce each new topic
of discussion."
119. Hancock v. State, 90 Fla. 178, 185, 105 So. 401, 403 (1925). The theory
advanced by the court seemed to be the redundancy and obviousness of the statement.
120. Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380, 381-82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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a prosecutor to strike the words "I think" from his trial vocabulary.
Inflammatory Argument
Under the guiding principle that argument should be restricted to
the record and to reasonable inferences therefrom, argument which is
inflammatory is objectionable.121 As stated by Mr. Justice Terrell,
"[t]he trial of one charged with crime is the last place to parade preju-
dicial emotions or exhibit punitive or vindictive exhibitions of tempera-
ment." 122 Obviously, given the nature of a criminal trial, and of law-
yers, this will be another difficult line to draw.128 Much discretion is
vested in the trial court,1 24 but here are some general guidelines.
Arguments which ask the jurors to place themselves in the shoes of
the victim, so-called golden-rule arguments, are held to be improper. 2 5
Perhaps the clearest example of such an argument may be found in the
case of Lucas v. State,1 26 where the prosecutor in a rape case asked of
the female jurors, "[t]hink how you ladies would feel it that happened
to you."'1 27 It was held that this comment required reversal because it
tended to deprive the defendant of his right to trial by an impartial
jury. 128
121. "[T]rials should be conducted coolly and fairly, without the indulgence in
abusive or inflammatory statements made in the presence of the jury by the prosecuting
officer." Goddard v. State, 93 Fla. 504, 515, 112 So. 83, - (1927); Landrum v. State,
79 Fla. 189, 84 So. 535 (1920); Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43 So. 312 (1907).
122. Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 1951).
123. "The history of the legal profession is clear also in its love of florid argu-
ments and dramatic perorations. The line between the inflammatory and the dramatic
is not clear." Collins v. State, 180 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 1965).
124. Sanchez v. State, 133 Fla. 160, 182 So. 2d 645 (1938).
125. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1966) ("your wife...
your sister . . . your daughter" in a prosecution for murder); Coley v. State, 185 So.
2d 472, 473 (Fla. 1966) ("their little daughter" in a rape prosecution in which the
prosecutrix was 17 years old); Barnes v. State, 88 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1952) ("what
if it was your wife or your sister or your daughter that this beast was after?").
126. 335 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
127. Id. at 567.
128. Id. Accord Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 387, 20 So. 232, 234 (1896). The
rule and rationale are the same in civil cases. See, e.g., Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d
74, 76 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
1460 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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Under the Florida Statutes and case law, the character of the de-
fendant may not be the subject of proof or prosecutorial comment ex-
cept in very limited circumstance. If the defendant offers proof of his
character, the State may offer evidence of other crimes, charges, or
acts as rebuttal12 if they are relevant and the state complies with no-
tice requirements. 30 Despite the clear-nature of this rule, prosecutors
129. FLA. STAT. § 90-404(1) (1981) provides:
90.404 Character evidence; when admissible. -
(1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY -
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is
inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a
particular occasion, except:
(a) Character of accused - Evidence of a pertinent trait of
his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the trait.
(b) Character of victim -
(1) Except as provided in s. 794.022, evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an ac-
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait; or
(2) Evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evi-
dence that the victim was the aggressor.
(c) Character of witness - Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in ss. 90.608-90.610.
See Young v. State, 142 Fla. 361, 195 So. 569 (1939); Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43
So. 312 (1907).
130. FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2) (1981) provides:
90.404 Character evidence; when admissible. -
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS -
(a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but is
inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad
character or propensity.
(b) 1. When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evi-
dence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no
fewer than 10 days before trial, the state shall furnish to the
accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends
to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an
461 117:1983
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have been stumbling frequently on it for years. The cases generally di-
vide themselves into two categories, 131 past bad acts and future bad
acts.
1 3 2
The fundamental rule as to past acts was stated in the early case
of Simmons v. State:1 33 "It is well settled that statements or intima-
tions by the prosecuting attorney that the accused has committed other
crimes besides that for which he is now on trial constitutes error."13 4
The argument disallowed in Simmons, a rape case, was a classic
example of the type of argument sought to be prevented by the rule:
"And we don't know how many other girls this old Simmons has car-
ried off that way who have never complained. ... 15 This argument
is improper precisely because we don't know.1"'
This rule may be violated in more subtle ways. Cases have found
indictment or information. No notice is required for evidence
of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal.
2. When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if re-
quested, charge the jury on the limited purpose for which the
evidence is received and is to be considered. After the close of
the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited pur-
pose for which the evidence was received and that the defen-
dant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the in-
dictment or information.
(3) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evi-
dence under § 90.610.
This statute embodies the so-called "Williams Rule," allowing the prosecutor to
use similar acts as evidence against a criminal defendant in certain circumstances. See
Williams v. State, I10 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959).
See generally Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). For an
excellent discussion in the context of prosecutorial questioning in this area, see Chap-
man v. State, 417 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 133-41.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45.
133. 139 Fla. 645, 190 So. 756 (1939), overruled on other grounds, 195 So. 2d
550 (1957); State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1967).
134. Id. at 758. Accord, Ailer v. State, 114 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1959); Carlile v. State, 129 Fla. 860, 176 So. 862 (1937).
135. Simmons, 190 So. at 758. Cf. Young v. State, 142 Fla. 351, 195 So. 569
(1939).
136. In Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 482, 23 So. 2d 558, 558 (1945), the
prosecutor stated at trial that the only reason the police had arrested the defendant was
because they could pin similar crimes on him.
20
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the characterization of the defendant in a DUI case as a "drunkard"
improper.137 Any intimation of prior criminal charges is objectionable
whether the reference is made directly'318 or indirectly.13 9 Indeed one of
the most common errors found in the cases comes from the inference
raised by reference to the defendant's photo in a "mug book" or "mug
shots,' 1 40 though it is not necessarily fatal error. 4'
The prohibition against implying future criminal acts may well be
the most commonly violated rule by prosecutors. 42 Case after case
reveals the prosecutor improperly raising before the jury the spectre of
the defendant walking out the door, ready to commit more crimes.
None stated it quite so well as did the prosecutor in Davis v. State,143
who summed up in this fashion: "Gentlemen, if this man is sent out on
the street to do the very same thing, the only question that can never
be resolved, if you will, or put in the same position to ask, 'Am I to be
next?' "'4 Such comments routinely produce reversals."5
137. Young, 195 So. at 569.
138. See, e.g., Gluck v. State, 62 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1952); Noeling v. State, 40 So.
2d 120 (Fla. 1949).
139. In Sherman v. State, 255 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1971), the prosecutor, refer-
ring to the defendant, stated: "He's seen me lots of times. It's not been under social
circumstances. . ..-
140. See, e.g., State v. Rucker, 330 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976); Loftin v. State, 273
So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973); Jones v. State, 194 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
141. See State v. Rucker, 330 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976).
142. See infra note 145.
143. 214 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
144. Id. at 42.
145. See, E.g., Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1967) ("Do you want to
give this man less than first degree murder and the electric chair and have him get out
and come back and kill somebody else, maybe you?"); Williams v. State, 68 So. 2d 583
(Fla. 1953) (acquittal of defendant by reason of insanity would lead to his ultimate
release from asylum to commit another homicide); Young v. State, 195 So. 569, 569
(Fla. 1940) ("the good honest people of the country should not sit down in solitude, in
inaction, and let these whores and drunkards get out here and slay our women and
children"); Gomez v. State, 415 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("let
these gentlemen ... walk away into our community and commit further crimes of this
nature"); McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("if
you want to let [defendant] walk out of here, if you want to let this kind of horrible
crime go on in Dade County"); Sims v. State, 371 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) ("to [glo get another one" in a case involving firearms); Porter v. State,




Defoor: Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
464 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
The prosecutor must also be careful of the characterizations, which
he draws from the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as char-
acterizations of the defendant. The easiest to deal with are the most
objectionable. Arguments directed at the defendant's race 4' or reli-
gion, 147 when not in issue, are clearly prohibited, as are arguments di-
rected at geographical prejudices.4 8 Courts have allowed references to
a defendant as a "murderer" ' 49 in a murder case, or a "thief' 150 in a
larceny case, but "assassin"151 has been disapproved, as has the state-
ment that the prosector "'wouldn't want to meet the defendant in a
dark alley.' 1152
From the cases, it would seem that the dividing line is based first
upon relevancy, and second upon whether there is fair factual basis for
the characterization in the record. Strong characterizations such as
"beast," "cruel human vulture," and "vile creature"153 have been al-
streets again" and "to put this man on the street to sell more heroin"); Russell v. State,
233 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (if the defendant were acquitted,
there would be "people getting stabbed all over Orange County"). Accord, Johnson v.
State, 408 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 750,
750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("let him go back out in your community and handle
more morphine"). In the case of Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 28-30 (Fla. 1959), the
court held that argument directed at what the defendant would do to the prosecutor's
family if defendant was not executed was reversible error.
146. Cooper v. State, 136 Fla. 23, 186 So. 230 (Fla. 1939); Huggins v. State,
129 Fla. 329, 176 So. 154 (Fla. 1937).
147. Gluck v. State, 62 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1952).
148. Knight v. State, 316 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
149. Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605, 609 (1923). "It is not revers-
ible error for the prosecuting attorney to refer to the defendant as a murderer where
the indictment is for murder and the evidence supports the charge."
150. Sanchez v. State, 133 Fla. 160, 165, 182 So. 645, 648 (1938), termed a
"border line question."
151. Landrum v. State, 79 Fla. 189, 84 So. 535 (1920); Gomez v. State, 415 So.
2d 822, 822 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
152. Zamot v. State, 375 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
153. Collins v. State, 180 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 1965); See also Breedlove v.
State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 n.10 (Fla. 1982) ("animalistic attack"); Darden v. State, 329 So.
2d 287, 289 (Fla. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 917 (1976), cert. dismissed, 430 U.S.
704 (1977) and cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1036 (1976) (defendant called an "animal");
Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28, 31, 196 So. 596, 598 (1940) ("skunks," "low-down
scoundrel"); Gaston v. State, 124 Fla. 538, 539, 184 So. 150, 151 (1938) ("malignant
growth").
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lowed where there is support for them in the record.'" The courts seem
to take the position that some cases are factually so extreme that there
is little a prosecutor might say to make it worse. 155 As stated in Spen-
cer v. State:'58 "In actuality, there is probably very little that the prose-
cutors themselves could have advanced which would have been any
more damning of the conduct of this appellant than the gruesome evi-
dence which was presented from the witness stand."
As a general rule, inflammatory arguments are distasteful and are
considered a sign of incompetence. 5 ' A competent prosecutor will sus-
tain his burden under the law with the facts, not by resort to innuendo
in order to give his case a false appearance of strength. 58
Attacks on Opposing Counsel
It appears that from time to time prosecutors seem unable to re-
strain themselves in their zeal, as they go beyond verbal assaults on the
defendant to attacks on defense counsel. 59 They have said some shock-
ing things about their adversaries. 60 The case of Douglass v. State 61
154. See, e.g., Roundtree v. State, 229 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
155. See infra note 156.
156. 133 So. 2d 729, 731-32 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 905 (1963).
Accord Holmes v. State, 228 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) ("it would
have been difficult for a prosecutor in this case to overcharacterize the reprehensible
acts shown in the evidence, or to present the facts in a worse light than the bare dis-
closure of them at the trial revealed"). See generally Note, The Nature and Conse-
quences of Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 969, n. 112.
157. Daugherty v. State, 154 Fla. 308, 310, 17 So. 2d 290, 291 (1944).
158. Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
159. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Johnson v.
State, 351 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1977); Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966); Irvin v.
State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954); Carter v. State,
356 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Simpson v. State, 352 So. 2d 125 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Cochran v. State, 280 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Evans v. State, 178 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), and notes 160-
164.
160. E.g., "Would you buy a used car from this guy" and "cheap shot artist."
Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d at 16 n.1.
Let me show you what perverted and distorted things a lawyer can do
465 117:1983
23
Defoor: Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
466 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
represents the worst example. In Douglass, the defendant was on trial
for incest, and the prosecutor gratuitously suggested that defense coun-
sel was also guilty of incest. 62 The courts have sternly disapproved of
such arguments, terming them both highly improper and unethical. 63
Such conduct, though, seems to be subject to the harmless error rule'4
and the doctrine of fair reply.1 65
when he wants to do it. How wrong it is, and when they try to do such as
this it is disgusting.
If he thought Mrs. Mayer had one word of testimony, he, himself,
violated his oath as a lawyer and violated his representation of this man
and as a human being. . . . He has no business being a lawyer if he
hadn't talked with her and found out that she knew nothing about it.
Adams, 192 So. 2d at 764. "How defense lawyers operate. . .," Cochran, 280 So. 2d at
43. "One of the favorite tricks of a defense lawyer," Simpson, 352 So. 2d at 126. But
see Westley v. State, 416 So. 2d 18, 19-20 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982) in which
"smokescreen" was approved.
161. 135 Fla. 199, 184 So. 756 (1929).
162. Id. at 757. It was such a comment which prompted the Third District Court
in Jackson to threaten to take disciplinary action against the Assistant State Attorney.
See note 160 supra.
163. The court in Simpson termed the prosecutor's statement "a gratuitous in-
sult to the adversary system which he serves." 352 So. 2d at 126. See FLORIDA BAR
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-37 (1981):
In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist be-
tween clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct, attitude and
demeanor toward opposing lawyers. A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory
personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers
interfere with the orderly administration of justice and have no proper place in our
legal system.
164. E.g., In Irvin, 66 So. 2d 288, and Simpson, 352 So. 2d 125, the error was
found harmless. In Adams, 192 So. 2d 762, Cochran, 280 So. 2d 42, and Carter, 356
So. 2d 67, it was held fatal. In Irvin, the comment was merely that the defense attor-
ney "stopped me from proving it," 66 So. 2d at 295, referring to a defense objection
which had been sustained. See also Johnson, 351 So. 2d 10.
165. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 178 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In
Evans defense counsel sought to discredit law enforcement efforts in the case, asking
why they hadn't been able to find an alibi witness which she had found and produced
at trial. The prosecutor's reply was "[w]e were wondering about that too," implying a
fabricated defense. Id. at 893.
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Duty
At the bottom of every prosecutor's bag of rhetorical tricks is that
personal favorite - the appeal to the jurors to "perform their public
duty," and bring in a verdict of guilty.116 Generally, so long as the
prosecutor stays otherwise within bounds, this line of argument is per-
missible.1 67 The sterner or more coercive the language used, the more
likely to be disapproved. For instance, the appeal "We are going to
continue to have life treated as a scrap of paper in the State of Florida,
until juries with backbones rise up and say we are going to stop it,"
was disallowed.16 8
The prosecutor must not, however, seek to shift or lighten the bur-
den upon the jurors by references to the existence of appellate courts to
correct any mistake they might make, and such references are revers-
ible error. 169 Nor may a prosecutor appeal to the jury to convict be-
cause of economic loss caused to them as taxpayers by the defen-
dant.1 70 However, in a drug case alleging possession of marijuana, the
statement "[t] hat is the reason so many high school students over the
166. Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 880
(1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 904 (1963).
167. "We realize that the situation in some cases justifies very strong appeals by
the prosection to arouse the patriotism and public duty of the jurors to perform the
duty which the law and the evidence in a case plainly justifies and calls for." Hender-
son v. State, 94 Fla. 318, 345, 113 So. 689, 698 (1927). Accord Thomas v. State, 326
So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1976); Betsy v. State, 368 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
168. Johnson v. State, 140 Fla. 443, 445, 191 So. 847, 848 (1939). The Johnson
court however found the error harmless. Id. Cf. Reed v. State, 333 So. 2d 524, 525
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). It is noteworthy how contemporary the argument in
Johnson sounds.
169. Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959); Blackwell v. State, 76 Fla.
124, 137, 79 So. 731, 735 (1918). See generally, Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1449 (1965). Cf.
Johnson v. State, 408 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (unheard of for a
person to spend more than two years in a hospital if declared insane).
170. Taylor v. State, 123 Fla. 358, 359, 166 So. 825, 826 (1936) (references to
the jurors supporting defendant's children in a criminal non-support case held revers-
ible error). Cf. Cooper v. State, 136 Fla. 23, 186 So. 230 (1939) (reference to taxpay-
ers' dollars spent investigating and prosecuting "Negro" cases, coupled with appeals to
social prejudice held reversible error). A mere casual referrence to the amount of time
and money expended by the jurors and the state, while not commended, does not neces-
sarily require reversal. Ellison v. State, 91 Fla. 502, 107 So. 639 (1926).
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country are using narcotics"171 was held to be not per se prejudicial.
There are a few areas of argument that are more a matter of style
than substance, yet they have cropped up in trials and case law from
time to time. First of these is a reading of law by counsel in closing
argument. Fundamentally, it is the function of the court, not counsel,
to give to the jury the applicable law in the case.17 2 Counsel submit
their requested charges at the charge conference, and the court selects
the theories of law applicable to the case. 17 -3 Once selected, counsel are
clearly permitted to relate the applicable law to the facts of the case in
closing argument, explaining and emphasizing those portions of the
charges relevant to their theory of the case.174
It has been said that it is "difficult for an attorney in the trial of a
case to refrain from expressing his view or opinion as to the law con-
trolling the case"175 but the jury is not bound by counsel's opinion as to
the controlling law.17 There have been cases in which the court, in its
discretion, permitted counsel to read other authorities to the jury. In
Tindall v. State,17 7 the judge's allowance of a prosector's reading of
law to the jury was upheld, absent a showing of prejudice.1 78 The court
stated, however, "correct practice does not permit counsel to read au-thorities to the jury.'' 79 In the case of Wright v. State80 the prosecu-
171. Sims v. State, 64 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1953).
172. In Brownlee v. State, 95 Fla. 755, 116 So. 618 (1928), the defendant ap-
pealed the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to read certain statutes to the
jury. The court held: "The rule that the law and statutes applicable to any case are to
be given by the court and not counsel is too elementary and universally recognized to
require any discussion here." Id. at 628. See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.390; FLA. STAT. §
918.10 (1981).
173. Simmons v. State, 160 Fla. 326, -, 36 So. 2d 207, 208 (1948); Tindall v.
State, 99 Fla. 1132, -, 128 So. 494, 498 (1930); Taylor v. State, 330 So. 2d 91, 93
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
174. Taylor, 330 So. 2d at 93.
175. Overstreet v. State, 143 Fla. 794, 796, 197 So. 516, 518 (1940).
176. Id.
177. 99 Fla. 1132, 128 So. 494 (1930).
178. The Tindall court made it clear that even when allowed by the trial court,
the practice could cause reversal if the law read were inapplicable and prejudicial.
Such a showing, however, was not made in Tindall. Id. at , 128 So. 498.
179. Id.
180. 79 Fla. 831, 84 So. 919 (1920).
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tor's repeated misstatements of law constituted reversible error.181 Tan-
gentially related is the question of whether counsel may read
scripture 82 to the jury. This is held to be a matter of discretion left to
the trial court and is generally not cause for reversal.18 3
The Doctrine of Invited Response or Fair Reply
The normal parameters of a prosecutor's remarks in closing argu-
ment can be significantly broadened by the nature of the defense's ar-
gument. The rule was stated in Pitts v. State: 4 "Defense counsel may
not make statements during summation which reasonably invite re-
sponse and then complain when his opponent's response is such as
would be reasonably expected to be elicited by defense counsel's own
prior remarks."' 85
In the earlier case of Henderson v. State,88 the Court laid down
the rule:
[W]e cannot afford to lay down a rule here which would make it
hereafter possible for an attorney for the defendant in any hard
fought criminal case to deliberately goad the state's attorney, by
unfounded or improper charges and insinuations, into heated, indis-
creet, and improper reply, and to then use such reply to secure a
reversal of the case, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence,
thus enabling him to take advantage of his own wrong. This would,
indeed, be a dangerous precedent.187
When the door is opened by defense counsel's argument, it swings
wide, and a number of areas barred to prosecutorial comment will sud-
181. Id. at 919.
182. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 861 (Fla. 1969) (Prosecutor's references
to "divine law" and the Bible).
183. Id. at 860-61.
184. 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
918 (1975).
185. Pitts, 307 So. 2d at 482 (citing Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1974)). Accord Howell v. State, 136 Fla. 582, 589, 187 So. 163, 166
(1939); Reyes v. State, 49 Fla. 17, 24, 38 So. 257, 258 (1905); Ricko v. State, 242 So.
2d 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
186. 94 Fla. 318, 113 So. 689 (1927).
187. Id. at 697.
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denly be subject to reply. What otherwise would have been improper
comment by the prosecutor will be seen as harmless. Defense counsel
who promises to prove an alibi or other facts in his opening argument
may find those promises thrown back in his face by the prosecutor in
summation.188 In the case of Simpson v. State818 the Court found no
error in the prosecutor's reiteration of the law stating that the defen-
dant's silence could not be held against him after defense counsel had
covered the point earlier.190 The court properly termed the comments
"perilous practice."191 But in one interesting case the defendant attor-
ney's comment that the fact the defendant didn't take the stand didn't
make him guilty was held to invite the response that it didn't make him
innocent either.
1 92
Normally, argument directed at the potential penalty the defen-
dant faces is improper.1 93 Arguments as to the penalty which a defen-
dant would receive upon conviction are fair reply where defense counsel
crosses this line first.194 In Smith v. State 95 defense counsel's comment
188. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 304 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
189. 352 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
190. Id. at 126. The court found the prosecutor's remarks had no "sinister influ-
ence." Id. (citing Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524, 540 (Fla. 1958)).
191. Id.
192. Testasecca v. State, 115 So. 2d-584 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
193. Cf. Waid v. State, 58 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1952).
It is a curious state of the law in Florida that the judge must instruct the jury on
the penalties in the case, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.390(a), Tascano v. State, 393 So. 2d 540
(Fla. 1981), and yet the jury is not to consider penalties in any way in reaching its
decision, Florida Standard Jury Instruction 2.15, adopted In re Standard Jury Instruc-
tions in Criminal Cases, 327 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1976). Therefore argument by counsel
concerning penalties would be improper.
These antagonistic themes have been termed "a Lewis Carroll fantasy flight back
and forth through the legal looking glass." Murray v. State, 378 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
194. But appellant's position is insecure for the simple reason that his
counsel, while addressing the jury, introduced the subject by remarking
upon the lack of testimony by the appellant, and the reason for it. What
followed was nothing more than a report by the attorney for the state.
A defendant may not reap the benefits of failure to testify, such as the
escape of cross-examination, and then claim the protection the statutes af-
ford, if he plays upon that very failure. When he brings to the attention of
the jury the want of testimony by him, and the reason for the course he
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that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would not put the
defendant back on the street, was held to justify the prosecutor's com-
ments that the defendant could be there in 30-60 days. Where the de-
fendant strained the facts of the case so that they approached a hypo-
thetical circumstance, the court did not view the prosecutor's question,
"where is the proof?" 198 as a comment upon the defendant's silence.
Even sympathetic characterizations of the defendant by defense counsel
must be approached with caution. In Whitney v. State 97 the defense
portrayed the defendant as a mere boy, an irresponsible youth, whose
crime had its roots in his domestic background.' 98 The court held this
to be an invitation to rebuttal and allowed the prosecution to portray
the defendant as a "professional killer" who "lived by the gun," based
upon the evidence of the defendant's methodical manner in killing and
robbing.""9 The invited response doctrine has been used to excuse ver-
bal sparring 2°° in the presence of the jury and other highly improper
statements20 ' which resulted from the heat of the exchange and the
responsive nature of the prosecutor's argument. Even the expression of
a prosecutor's belief in the justness of his cause has been excused by
the defense portrayal of the prosecution as offering "bold lies," "false
testimony," and "buying" evidence. 02
chose, he invites a rebuttal from his adversary, and of that he cannot
complain.
Waid, 58 So. 2d 146, 146.
195. 273 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The prosecutor went that
fatal one step too far by saying "because there is no possibility of keeping him there
longer." Id. at 415.
196. Sadler v. State, 222 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In Sad-
ler, defense counsel had conjured up a possible affair and love triangle, seemingly out
of the air. Similarly, in State v. Mathis, a defense argument to consider the voluntari-
ness of the confession, unsupported by any evidence of coercion, was held to invite the
rhetorical question if the jury had heard "one thing about [the defendant] getting
beaten up. . .," 278 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 1973).
197. 132 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1961).
198. Id. at 602.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Parrish v. State, 97 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
201. Evans v. State, 178 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (prosecutor
suggested a contrived alibi defense).
202. See, e.g., Broge v. State, 288 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
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Effects of Misconduct
When a prosecutor advances an improper argument, the abdica-
tion of his duty imposes certain obligations upon defense counsel and
the court. Even absent any objection, it is the duty of the trial court to
check the improper remarks of counsel, and to apply the appropriate
remedy in order to erase its effect from the mind of the jury.203
Where the defense doesn't object to a remark, it is more likely to
be viewed as nonprejudicial or the objection seen as waived.20 4 Accord-
ingly, it is the duty of defense counsel to call to the attention of the
court the prosecutor's improper argument by objecting to it.20° Further,
the objection must be contemporaneous with the improper conduct.206
It is incumbent upon defense counsel to seek the remedy which he feels
is appropriate in light of the comment. 0 7
Remedies and Technical Requirements
The court may remedy the improper argument by stopping it,
striking it, applying a curative instruction, rebuking the prosecutor
before the jury, or declaring a mistrial. The nature of the prosecutor's
remark, the seriousness of the charge, and the motion made by defense
counsel are the key factors in consideration of the appropriate remedy
for prosecutorial misconduct in argument.
In some cases, upon objection; the prosecutor has withdrawn the
argument and apologized for it, and this has been seen as sufficient
cure.20 8 In other cases merely halting the line of argument by sus-
taining the objection was sufficient.20 9 Many comments may be cured
203. Oglesby v. State, 23 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1945); Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564,
572, 98 So. 609, 612 (1923).
204. E.g., Smith v. State, 3 So. 2d 516, 517 (Fla. 1941).
205. E.g., Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 385 (Fla. 1959).
206. Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).
207. "The important thing is that the defendant retain primary control over the
course to be followed in the event of such an error." Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331,
335 (Fla. 1978)(citing United States v. Dinitz, 724 U.S. 600 (1976)).
208. North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77, 86-87 (Fla. 1953), af'd, 346 U.S. 932 (1954).
209. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 180 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1965); Dean v. State, 83 So.
2d 777 (Fla. 1955). Accord, Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978), quashed, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980).
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by the court's rebuking the prosecutor before the jury in a manner suf-
ficient to impress the members of the jury that they should not consider
the argument, and further instructing the jury to disregard the com-
ment, and adding any other necessary curative instructions.210
The final option is declaration of a mistrial.21 Generally speaking,
defense counsel should contemporaneously object, seek curative instruc-
tions, and then affirmatively move for a mistrial, 21 2 in order to preserve
his rights on appeal.213 Failure to comply with these procedural re-
quirements may be seen as a bar to raising the issues on appeal.
214
Further, as noted earlier, the doctrine of fair reply or invited comment
may preclude relief for an otherwise objectionable statement.21 5 How-
ever, where the prosecutor's comments are "of such character that
neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influ-
ence. . . a new trial should be granted regardless the lack of objection
or exception. ' 216 In such cases the error is seen as going to the heart of
the case, depriving the defendant of the essential fairness of his crimi-
nal trial.217
Certain trends emerge from the cases. On one hand, some argu-
ments almost inevitably cause reversal when objected to by counsel.
These include the previously mentioned categories of comment upon
the defendant's silence,218 appeals to racial prejudice,2x9 or predictions
210. Harper v. State, 411 So. 2d 235, 237 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing
Deas v. State, 119 Fla. 893, 161 So. 2d 729 (1939)).
211. Cf. Cumbie v. State, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980); Mabery v. State, 303 So.
2d 369, 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
212. Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1978).
213. Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1982). "Contemporaneously"
means during the offending closing argument, or at the very least at its conclusion.
Cumbie, 380 So. 2d at 1033.
214. Ferguson, 417 So. 2d at 641-42.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 184-201.
216. Ailer v. State, 114 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Accord,
Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
217. Peterson, 376 So. 2d at 1230. Defense counsel should not rely on this resort,
however, since it is limited to the narrow category where the error is fundamental. Cf.
Clark, 363 So. 2d at 333. Since the Clark case found unobjected-to prosecutorial com-
ment upon the defendant's silence not to be such error, it should be clear that this will
be true only in rare cases.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 43-92.
219. See supra note 146. Cf. Thomas v. State, 419 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1982).
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of future criminal activity.220 On the other hand, there is no presump-
tion that juries are led astray by the improper arguments of counsel.221
The appellate court must review each case in its own context 222 with
the standard being whether the court can see from the record that the
remarks or conduct of the prosecutor did not prejudice the accused.223
Unless that conclusion is reached, the case must be reversed. The na-
ture224 and frequency 225 of the prosecutor's comments are weighed on
one hand, and the overall strength of the state's case 228 on the other.
Also involved in this balancing process is the nature of the charge;
courts will be less hesitant to find the argument prejudicial in a capital
case.- 27 It remains the duty of defense counsel, however, to show
prejudice. It should be remembered that the defendant is entitled to a
fair trial, not a perfect one.2 28
Future Directions
Of course, reversal is not the only solution to the problem. Indeed
220. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
221. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 860 (Fla. 1969). Accord, Tyson v. State,
87 Fla. 392, 393, 100 So. 254, 255 (1924); Johnson v. State, 348 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
222. State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. 1967).
"Statements that might appear improper when considered in a vacuum, may be
found permissible when examined in context." Nelson v. State, 416 So. 2d 899, 900
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(quoting United States v. Forrest, 620 F. 2d 446, 455-56
(5th Cir. 1980)). Accord, McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
223. Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959); McCall v. State, 120 Fla. 707,
163 So. 38 (1938). Accord Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
224. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935); Mabery v. State, 303 So.
2d 369, 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
225. Berger, 295 U.S. at 78.
226. Cummings v. State, 412 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Cf Coleman v.
State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
227. See Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1967); Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d
380, 385 (Fla.1959); Jones v. State, 194 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
228. Zide v. State, 212 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (citing
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953)).
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the reversal of a case for this cause may prejudice society more than
the prosecutor. Witnesses disappear, memories fade and it becomes
more difficult to prosecute the defendant several years later at the con-
clusion of the appellate process. It has also been suggested that some
prosecutors, however unethically, may be anticipating ultimate rever-
sal, but view the time served by a defendant in the interim as sufficient
punishment229 - so-called "state attorney time." Some prosecutors
may feel it expedient to "win" today and deal with the reversal later.230
The virtue of the sanction threatened by the court in Jackson v.
State,2 31 disciplinary action against the offending prosecutor, is that it
places the deterrent effect directly where it will do the most good. Dis-
ciplinary action could be applied in the local courts in the form of con-
tempt of court232 or disciplinary proceedings,233 and a punishment
molded to the offense. The Florida Bar could impose penalties ranging
from reprimand to disbarment.234 Other commentators have explored
yet other remedies, including civil liability,235 and removal from of-
fice,238 each with its own drawbacks.237 The reluctance of trial courts to
act in such a fashion, and the fact that no appellate case in Florida
save Jackson has ever proposed a remedy other than reversal, may be
traced to the same point of origin - the courts are reluctant to be so at
odds with the quasi-judicial officers who are viewed as an arm of the
229. See comments of the court in Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15 (1982).
230. Cain, supra note 23, at 41.
231. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15; Note, The Nature and Consequences of
Forensic Misconduct, supra note 25, at 981. Cf. Kleinfeld v. State, 270 So. 2d 22 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) and case cited therein.
232. Shelley v. District Court of Appeal, 350 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1977); see also
Rule 3.840, Fla. R. Crim. P.
233. Fla. Bar Integr. Rule art. XI Rule 11.14; see generally Burns v. Huffstetler,
So. 2d - (Fla. 1983), 13 Fla. L.W. at 164 (May 12, 1983).
234. Fla. Bar Integr. Rule art. XI, Rules 11.01-11.13, see also Jackson, 421 So.
2d 15; Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5.
235. Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5,
at 979. Prosecutors at common law were absolutely immune from liability for acts in
the scope of their duties. This immunity was not changed by 42 U.S.C. 1983. See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). This, of course, could be altered by statute.
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court.238 It is natural to expect of prosecutors proper motives and con-
duct. The recriminations inherent in allegations to the contrary are
doubtless not relished by anyone on either side.
It is not the purpose of this article to explore the nontraditional
alternatives available to the courts in deterring prosecutors from such
comments. The court's opinion in Jackson, while not an empty threat,
is intended as a warning shot across the bow, designed to turn prosecu-
tors away from such actions. If the warning is not heeded, the courts
and commentators will be revisiting the subject within a year.
238. Smith v. State, 194 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1957).
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